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"Magic" was the name given to the American decoding of the secret
Japanese codes used in diplomatic communications before and during
the PacificWar of 1941-1945. The argument is that in the finalphase of
the eight months of U.S.-Japan talksleading up to the attack on Pearl
Harbor, serious mistranslations in Magic were a significantfactorin
the failureto reach an agreement. This was in addition to the cumula-
tive effectof mutual misunderstandings which grew between the two
sides over a longer period,to be covered in a subsequent thesis entitled
"The Role of'Magic' Distortionsin 'CrisisManagement' during the U.S.
-Japan Peace Talks of 1941" in Seijo University Economics Papers
(Keizai Kenkyu ^^ffif^S)No.l37, published by The Economics Institute
of Seijo University. Both these theses are based on a comprehensive
study by the author in his doctoral dissertationat the University of Ox-
ford,1994.1]In spite of the number of historians who take the opposite
view, these theses argue that the effortsmade by the participants on
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both sides to achieve a successful outcome and avert military conflict, or
at least to delay the outbreak of the war until the following March of
1942, might have been much closer to achieving success than is gener-
ally believed up to now.
The later stages of the crisis were specifically precipitated by the
exchange, and misinterpretation, of key proposals by both sides. In
early November the Japanese prepared a "Plan for Negotiation with the
U.S." (Taibei Kosho Yoryo M^ltW^W , consisting of Proposal A (ko-
an ^PS) and Proposal B (otsu-an Zj%) . On the American side, the so
-called "Hull Note" was presented by Secretary of State Cordell Hull to
Japan in late November. The critical point of the latter was the omis-
sion of a part, the "modus vivendi", which was in effect a temporary
compromise that could have delayed any action until March of the fol-
lowing year.
As is widely recognised by observers, there were three main areas
of dispute during the negotiations : firstly,the question of non-discrimi-
nation in trade, secondly the Tripartite Pact of September 1940 be-
tween Germany, Italy and Japan, and thirdly the issue of Japan's with-
drawal from China. In all three of these important areas, mistransla-
tions of Magic materials gave the U.S. false or distorted information re-
garding Japan's intentions.
One of the most serious distortions among many others2' concerned
the very issue of Japan's willingness to compromise on these three
points. Proposal A (presented by Japan on November 7th) in the Magic
translation has a meaning which is opposite to that of the original text.
The Magic version of Telegram #726 has the establishment of a fourth
item : "(4) As a matter of principle, we are anxious to avoid having this
inserted in the draft of the formal proposal reached between Japan and
－62－
the United States ...",but no such item existsin the originalJapanese
text.This is the result of a mistranslation from the originalsentence,
"Moreover, concerning the [Secretary of State Cordell Hull's]Four Prin-
ciples,avoid to the utmost including these in a formal agreement..." As
pointed out by the Defence at the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East (the Tokyo Trial).
This paragraph in the intercepted message is given a separate num-
ber,(4),thereby making it appear coordinate with (1) Non-discrimi-
nation in Trade, (2) Interpretation and Application of the Tripartite
Pact, and (3) Withdrawal of Troops. By thus seeming to be one of the
main divisions of the message and cognate with the others, and by
the omission of the words "the four principles"and instead referring
to anxiety to avoid having "this"included in the agreement, this
clause of course says that the Japanese willtry to escape committing
themselves to a formal agreement embodying the points which they
have proposed above―all ofthem.31
THE NON-DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE
Concerning the non-discrimination principle with regard to China, in
the originaltelegram Japan interpreted the U.S.'s positionto the effect
that "itwould not be wise for either Japan or the United States to adopt
one policyin a particular region while adopting an opposing policyin
another region".The Magic interpreter,however, mistranslated thisas :
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"itmight be feasible for either country within a certain specified area to
adopt a given policy and for the other party within another specified
area to adopt a complementary policy".4'
This has misled even historians, including F. C. Jones who con-
cluded wrongly in his post-war publication that: "Togo intimated that
while the question of non-discrimination in trade was put on a world-
wide basis, the Japanese Government really wanted a regional agree-
ment, and he supposed that understanding could easily be reached on
this".5)However, Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo ]&MMW>
himself wrote in his memoirs : "It was hard to understand why, while
Hull insisted that 'equality of commercial opportunity' would soon be
applied to the whole world, China's 'equality of commercial opportunity'
should not be applied at the same time [since the idea of China's appli-
cation at the same time as for the rest of the world was a Japanese con-
cept rejected by the U.S. when they insisted on the earlier application
for China]..."61
THE TRIPARTITE PACT
With regard to her membership in the Tripartite Pact, Japan repeat-
edly tried to emphasise that she would act "independently" from Ger-
many, and not participate "automatically" in the European War, in the
event of the U.S. entering it against Germany.71 Her intention to act "in-
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dependently", i.e. in reality to walk out from the Tripartite Pact, was
mentioned in two telegrams in Japanese sent from Tokyo to Ambassa-
dor Kichisaburo Nomura If H o"H^P in Washington in mid-November.
In the first (#773),8) the term "independently" was mistranslated by
Magic as "automatically".91 In the second (#800),10) the last part contain-
ing the term "independently" was abbreviated.111
The mistranslation of "automatically" for "independently" was par-
ticularly serious in view of the fact that Japan and Germany had strug-
gled for many years over this very issue. Of course, Secretary of State
Hull could not know from the intercepts about this serious mistransla-
tion, which virtually reversed the meaning of the original text. Conse-
quently, he states in his memoirs :
The following day Kurusu [Saburo Kurusu 3^fl3JEiJtP,the Ambassador
sent in November 1941 to Washington] came alone to see me and
handed me a formula that he said clarified Japan's obligations under
the Tripartite Alliance. This merely recited Kurusu's personal inter-
pretation, given from his viewpoint as the man who had signed the
treaty for Japan. He declared that Japan herself could interpret her
obligations under the Pact ...I said I did not think the paper he had
handed me would be of any particular help, and so dismissed it.121
It is not surprising that Hull judged it as "merely ...Kurusu's per-
sonal interpretation" and therefore that it could not be "any particular
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help" because he had already read the content of the mistranslated
Magic versions. Kurusu himself notes in his memoirs that he offered his
proposal under instruction from Telegram #800 sent the day before.13'
Thus an important chance to take into account the new proposal pre-
sented by Tokyo was missed. Professor Chihiro Hosoya HB^r-^ffflob-
serves that:
Japanese leaders seem to have taken for granted that their real pur-
pose had been made clear to the United States by the two messages
they had sent and by their failure to supply aid to Germany. There-
fore Foreign Minister Togo was surprised when Hull insisted in a talk
with Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura that Japan must clearly indi-
cate that ifit entered into an agreement with the United States, "the
Tripartite Pact would automatically become a dead letter."It was evi-
dent that the Japanese leaders had failed to communicate their posi-
tion to the American officials.141
It was, in any case, impossible "to communicate their position to
the American officials" when the Americans had secretly read and un-
critically accepted the Magic translations which persistently changed
the meaning of the original term "independently" to "automatically".
Hull wrote later in 1948, "itrequired very little scrutiny to see that they
[the conditions in Proposal B] were utterly unacceptable ...[and] ...on
their face were extreme". He also stated that "The President and I could
only conclude that ...no responsible American officialcould ever have
dreamed of accepting them".151
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Even during the post-war period, a number of historians have
maintained the same view as Hull towards the nature of the Proposal at
that time. For instance, in his publication of 1965, with "the authoriza-
tion of [Secretary of the Treasury] Henry Morgenthau",16' John Blum of
Yale University states, without recognising the issue of these mistrans-
lations, that "in the event of American participation in the European
war, Japan would 'automatically carry out what she understands to be
the obligations' of the Axis Pact" while "It [Proposal B, presented on No-
vember 20th] obligated the United States to unfreeze Japanese assets,
to lift the embargo on oil".Blum emphasises that "MAGIC's window on
that development confirmed the distaste of Roosevelt and Hull for any
consideration of Plan B".17)If it is the case that the views of Morgenthau
and Blum about the influence of Magic on the thinking of the decision
makers are accurate, the confusion between "independently" and "auto-
matically" created by the English version of the intercepts played a fa-
tal role in the formation of U.S. decision-making.
WITHDRAWAL FROM CHINA
Regarding "the Japanese troops sent to China during the China Inci-
dent", Tokyo offered in the proposals to withdraw from the rest of China,
except North China, Inner Mongolia and Hainan MW Island, "simulta-
neously with the establishment of peace in accordance with arrange-
ments to be made between Japan and China, and the withdrawal will
be completed within two years". Regarding those specific areas, Tokyo
stated that the troops "will remain for a necessary period of time after
the establishment of peace between Japan and China"18' and added in
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the Note of the Item that "in case the United States asks what the 'nec-
essary period of time' will be, we will respond that we have in mind 25
years". However, the Magic translation of the Note is : "Should the
American authorities question you in regard to 'the suitable period', an-
swer vaguely that such a period should encompass 25 years".191As noted
by Jackson Noyes Huddleston Jr. of the University of Washington, "The
implied deceptiveness in the MAGIC translation Vaguely' does not exist
in the 'original'.Such a mistake could only add to Secretary Hull's belief
in the insincerity of the Japanese".201
Regarding the definition of the "necessary period", there were in
fact various opinions in Tokyo, from the hardest, 99 years, to the softest,
five years. Foreign Minister Togo judged that the domestic situation
was far from the point of reaching a "unanimous agreement" at this
stage, although Japan should "satisfy the desire of the United States by
making the evacuation of troops a fundamental principle" and "deline-
ate the area and duration" to "dispel their doubt". Thus, he decided to
suggest "25 years" at this stage, if the worst came to the worst. He was,
of course, fully aware that "25 years" of occupation was too extreme to
be accepted by the United States, and he confirmed with Prime Minis-
ter Hideki Tojo ^Cfll^fl that "should the U.S. Government respond
positively to either Proposal A or Proposal B, Japan would have to make
a further compromise". Togo's goal was "five years", and "25 years" was
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in his mind a tentative idea.211This was why he instructed Ambassador
Nomura "at this time to negotiate strictly on the abstract term 'neces-
sary time'" and explained that "ifwe were to state clearly the necessary
period for stationing troops, rather than clarifying the matter, we fear it
would confuse the situation".221
This part of the message, which indicated the sensitivity of the is-
sue, was completely omitted by the Magic translator. Instead, phrases
were added which did not exist in the original text: "On the matter of
duration of occupation, whenever pressed to give a clear statement we
have hitherto couched our answers in vague terms. I want you in as in-
decisive yet as pleasant language as possible to euphemise".231 None of
these terms : "whenever", "pressed", "hitherto", "vague", "indecisive",
"yet", "as pleasant as possible", or "euphemise" can be seen in the origi-
nal text.
Furthermore, when Togo instructed Nomura to "make every effort
to impress them with the fact that we do not intend to station troops in-
definitely or permanently",241 this earnest tone was missed in the Magic
version. The English version gives the impression of simply playing
with words and appears to suggest deceptiveness ; "try to impart to
them the effect that unlimited occupation does not mean perpetual oc-
cupation".251
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PROPOSAL A AS "FINAL"
Proposal A was described as the "finalproposal"in the Magic version of
Telegram #726 of November 4th although the originalJapanese term
"saishuteki joho-an SI4^JHS^^" cannot be the equivalent of a "final
proposal" in the meaning of the term in English, since, as the subse-
quent Magic version of #727 of the same day itselfcorrectlytranslated,
Proposal B was prepared as a "substituteplan" in the event "Ifthere ap-
pears to be a remarkable difference between the Japanese and Ameri-
can view [on Proposal A]". Although the Magic translator accurately
translated the part mentioned above, Proposal B in the Magic version of
#727 is again exaggerated as "theidea of making a last effortto prevent
something happening", while the phrase "a last effort"does not existin
the originalJapanese text.261One point which became clearfrom the tes-
timony of State Department Representative Joseph W. Ballantine at
the Tokyo Trialis that "the knowledge gained from thisintercept [#726]
vitiated the State Department's beliefin the sincerityof the Japanese
and that,subsequently, the State Department was on its guard".27'
Magic also decoded Telegram #762 of the 11th from Tokyo to
Nomura. The Magic version, again, contains mistranslations which
could have only confused the American decision makers with regard to
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the status of Proposal A. The phrases of the original text, the "latest
proposal" (saigo-an M&'M) and "Proposal A under our latest instruc-
tion" (saigo kunrei Ko-an MI^Ul|^"^P^), were translated as "our final
proposal" and "our final Proposal A", although the term "saigo MW ob-
viously was meant in the sense of "the latest" in the context of the origi-
nal text.28'The term "saigo" can indeed mean "last" (hence "final"),but
that sense is not logically appropriate here since, as was quite clearly
stated in Telegram #781 of the 15th, "we have not as yet presented our
'B' proposal to the United States". The logical inconsistency was not
noted by the Magic translators who, in the same #781, again mistrans-
lated "saigo-an" as "a final proposal", reinforcing the already exagger-
ated impression of Japan's aggressive attitude.291
Immediately after the proposals were formally adopted at the
Gozen Kaigi of November 5th, Togo again sent the contents of Proposals
A and B to Nomura (#735 and #736).30)At this time he instructed him to
maintain a friendly attitude for the purpose of making every effort to
reach agreement with the U.S., by avoiding giving any impression of a
"deadline" or ultimatum. He also sent a message instructing Nomura to
keep in mind that Japan needed to sign an agreement with the U.S. by
November 25th. Magic intercepted them and recognised November 25th
as being the Japanese "deadline",31' but made serious mistranslations
and distortions. The original Japanese term "[presentation of Proposal
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B] as a means of overcoming final barriers" was mistranslated as "our
[Japanese] absolutely final proposal". The Americans also had no
means of knowing that November 25th was not defined as the deadline
at the conference in Tokyo but rather "the 25th" was deliberately men-
tioned by Togo as a personal tactic to push Nomura to try to reach an
agreement more quickly because Nomura, in Togo's view, tended to
move too slowly.321
Hull states in his memoirs that:
For the firsttime we now saw a deadline stated in the intercepts. In a
message to Nomura on November 5, Togo said : "Because of various
circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for
the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this
month"... This, to us, could mean only one thing. Japan had already
set in motion the wheels of her war machine, and she had decided not
to stop short of war with the United States if by November 25 we had
not agreed to her demands.33'
Although the real deadline was set for Decemberlst in Tokyo,34'
which was only six days later than November 25th, this difference was
quite significant when one considers the following facts. First, Hull had
decided to remove the modus vivendi from the Hull Note by the early
hours in the morning of the 26th after much consideration,351 and clearly
indicated to Secretary of War Henry Stimson later the same morning
that war had become inevitable because the modus vivendi was re-
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moved. Second, one factor which promoted Hull's decision was his belief
that Proposal B was the "absolutely final proposal" described in the
Magic translation, although as already mentioned it could stillconsti-
tute a Japanese "modus vivendi" proposal.361 Japanese primary sources
clearly prove that, even after receiving the Hull Note, there was stilla
complicated process and significant resistance before Tokyo reached the
decision to go to war. In fact, the formal Japanese decision to open hos-
tilitieswas not made until the Gozen Kaigi of December 1st, the real
deadline set at the conference of November 5th. As observed by Roberta
Wohlstetter (the author of Pearl Harbor―Warning and Decision37' in
1962), "He [Hull] continued to mourn the fate of the modus vivendi"38'
even after he handed the Hull Note to the Japanese ambassadors
Nomura and Kurusu. Thus there was stilltime and room to reconsider
a modus vivendi.
MISINTERPRETED TONE OF MAGIC
There are many instances of Magic hardening the tone of the original
telegrams. For example, the Magic version of #725, which explained the
general background and the Japanese intentions in preparation of the
proposals, contains several misconceptions of this kind. The original
phrase : "As a result of sincere, careful deliberation, we have decided to
continue the negotiations" is translated in the Magic version as : "we
have decided as a result of these deliberations, to gamble once more on
the continuance of the parleys". Although Japan's sincerity towards the
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negotiations was emphasised in the whole of the original text, the
Magic interpreter gave an image of Japan as a reckless gambler by add-
ing phrases such as "to gamble once more" and "the parleys".
Similarly, another sentence attached to the original text: "the suc-
cess or failure of the present negotiations will have an enormous influ-
ence on ...the fate of our empire [Japan]" is converted by the interpreter
to : "In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die".
Again, the words "gambled" and "the throw of this die" do not exist in
the original text. The original text also states that: "Because we desire
to talk over a peaceful adjustment of the situation, as we enter into the
last stages of the negotiations, we earnestly hope the United States gov-
ernment will turn about and reconsider seriously from an over-all view
of maintaining Japanese-American relations and will use discretion in
considering this extremely grave state of affairs". The Magic version,
however, translated it in a very different tone : "Itis to be hoped ear-
nestly that looking forward to what may come at the end―at the last
day of Japanese―American negotiations―the government of the United
States will think ever so soberly how much better it would be to make
peace with us ; how much better this would be for the whole world situ-
ation". It is clear that the sense of earnest sincerity for "a peaceful ad-
justment of the situation" in the original text was completely missed by
the Magic translations. The impression given by the Magic version is
that the Japanese were flaunting their strength before the Americans.
In this sense, the Magic version could be seen as no less than a threat to
the Americans.
One should be aware of the obvious fact that those messages in-
cluding Telegram #725 were drawn up by the officialsof the Tokyo For-
eign Office for their colleagues in Washington as private messages, and
were not assumed to be read by the Americans. Therefore, the sense of
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sincerity in the original message #725 was not part of propaganda. In
the same context, to the Japanese foreign officialsit certainly did not
make any sense to flaunt their strength before their colleagues. Here,
the translated version is one example of misinterpretation, amongst a
number of others, which was caused by the interpreter's stereotyped
image of the Japanese. Thus, the consequence was an accumulation of
overtones in the decoded version. After carefully examining those dis-
tortions and overtones in the English version of #725, Ben Blakeney of
the Defence at the Tokyo Trial stated that "itis the whole spirit which
is wrong".391
It is interesting to observe how effectively the Magic misconcep-
tions could influence the formation of fixed images in readers who al-
ready had some pre―conceptions of the pre-war Japanese and their cul-
ture. Examples which show such an influence can be found even in the
works of post-war scholars. Roberta Wohlstetter, for instance, com-
ments about Telegram #725 that "The manner of saying this―'a throw
of the die,' 'the brink of chaos,'―was also dramatically urgent, even if
somewhat alien to the American mode of speech"401 without realising
that both of them were invented by the American interpreter and were
not used by the Japanese officials.In fact, the latter phrase : "will ...be
the brink of chaos" should read correctly in the original text: "will face
a rupture". It is not surprising that the contemporary American leaders
who had access to the intercepts were not sympathetic to the Japanese
position.
As a more specific example Wohlstetter quotes telegram #725 :
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"Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the
edge, and our [Japanese] people are losing confidence in the possibility
of ever adjusting them". She comments on telegram #725 in general
terms that: "There is no doubt about the meaning of this cable"411while
she is not aware of the fact that, as pointed out by John Toland, "Such
pessimism was not in the original". In fact, the original phrase should
read correctly : "Strenuous efforts are being made day and night to ad-
just Japanese-American relations, which are on the verge of rupture".42'
Telegram #764 of November 12th from Foreign Minister Togo to
Ambassador Nomura conveyed the gist of a conversation Togo had had
with the British Ambassador in Tokyo. There are, however, mistransla-
tions. The most serious one is the translated sentence in the English
version : "A speedy settlement can be made depending entirely upon the
attitude of Britain and the United States", while it should read cor-
rectly that: "depending on what the attitude of Britain and the United
States is, there is a way to swift agreement". Thus, while Togo only ex-
pressed the realities of the situation, the Magic interpreter gave an im-
pression, by adding the term "entirely", that Togo tried to place respon-
sibility completely on Britain and the United States. Again, the word
"entirely" does not exist in the original version. Togo's sense of sincerity
in his effort to avoid a conflict was emphasised in the original text and
greatly impressed the British Ambassador, but was missed in the Magic
version. Even the original phrase "kikyoku o kaihi fuif^i&MM",which
means "to avoid a crisis",was missed by the interpreter who translated
it as "to ride out the crisis".431
－76－
On November 7th Secretary of State Hull argued in the U.S. Cabi-
net that "from the tone of the intercepts", a Japanese attack on the U.S.
was imminent.44' On the same day when Ambassador Nomura submit-
ted Proposal A to Hull, the Secretary of State judged that "the proposals
...are merely rewordings of the previous Japanese points. They contain
nothing basically new, nor do they offer any real concessions".451
As Herbert Feis observes, "Earnestly he [Nomura] presented Pro-
posal A" to the Secretary of State at the meeting of the 7th. In sharp
contrast, Hull did not pay any reasonable attention to it but only "a
rapid glance at the contents" since he thought that he "already knew" it
through the Magic intercept.461 The reality was, as noted by Professor
Toshikazu Kase JlD#lf^^, that Hull knew only the "strikingly misinter-
preted content" of Proposal A.471
In addition, one should recognise that this event shows another
problem of using decoded intercepts for diplomacy, separate from the is-
sue of misinterpretations. Whatever the conditions contained in Pro-
posal A, virtually no diplomat could ever have been interested in consid-
ering them sincerely, when one knew in advance that one's adversary
had already prepared Proposal B and was going to present the new one
in the event of an American refusal of Proposal A. This problem would
not have been caused if the American diplomats had not had access to
the intercepts. In this sense, the Japanese efforts to reach an agreement
made for thirteen days between the date of presentation of Proposal A,
the 7th, and that of Proposal B, the 20th, were consequently entirely
wasted during this crucial period. Although Foreign Minister Togo met
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Ambassador Joseph Grew in Tokyo on the 10th in his effort to avoid any
miscommunications, and although he presented him an English text of
Proposal A prepared by the Japanese government,48' there was little
likelihood of Togo being able to bring the American decision-maker's at-
tention to the text, partly because Grew's information itself had been
discredited in Washington.491 In the end, Proposal A was, as observed by
Feis, "in truth, dead before it was delivered".501
Indeed, Professor Paul Schroeder was given the impression that
"There can be little doubt that not only Nomura and Kurusu in Wash-
ington, but also Togo and Tojo were earnestly trying to gain acceptance
of the Japanese proposition and thus striving, within limits, to reach an
agreement with the United States and avert war".511.However, the mis-
leading over-emphases in the Magic version such as "inevitable", "im-
possible" instead of "very difficult(shinan MUD", and "entirely unsuit-
able" instead of "not suitable" (#844) failed to express Japan's hope for
reaching an agreement. The author thinks that this perception gap can
be attributed to neither Togo nor Hull. This is because the author him-
self is given the same impression of the telegram as Togo described
from its original Japanese text, and the same impression of it as Hull
described from its Magic version in English.
In the case of Telegram #812 Magic caused further confusion in the
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U.S.―Japan peace negotiations. One of the original sentences, "While
maintaining the prearranged policy, the Japanese government is going
to intensively do its best [in our negotiations with the United States]
with sincerity and reason [jori1#Ii] to overcome the current difficult
barriers as far as any hope stillremains, and by doing so the govern-
ment wishes to avert the crisisin U.S.-Japan relations" was mistrans-
lated in the Magic version as "Stick to your fixed policy and do your best.
Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire". This dis-
tortion was the result of many serious mistakes, including the transpo-
sition of the grammatical subjects "ambassadors" and "Japanese gov-
ernment". Also, the date of "the 29th" was mentioned only once in the
original text, but it is noticeably repeated in the Magic translation. In
addition, the date "25th", which was mentioned in the previous message
of November 5th, was also added in the Magic translation, although it
was not mentioned in the original text. Thus, the concept of "deadline"
was over-emphasised in the tone of the Magic translation. Conse-
quently, Secretary of State Hull later stated in his work :
An intercepted message from Tokyo to Nomura and Kurusu on that
day, November 22, confirmed my belief. This message extended the
deadline from November 25 to 29. After that, war. "Stick to our [sic]
fixed policy and do your very best," it said. "Spare no efforts, and try
to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your
ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese―American rela-
tions by the 25th ; but ...you can finish your conversations ...by the
29th (let me write it out for you―twenty-ninth)... the deadline abso-
lutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to
happen" ...It was in the shadow of that phrase―"after that things are
automatically going to happen"―that we labored desperately during
the next two weeks, striving to the last for peace or at least more
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time.521
Professor T. Kase, who actually drew up this message as secretary
to the Foreign Minister, has not agreed with the interpreter's transla-
tion. Kase states that "Itis open to say that the interpreter deliberately
aimed at breaking down the negotiations".531 Some historians who use
only the English Magic version of the messages stillmisunderstand the
issue of the "deadline", even in the post-war period. Wohlstetter, for in-
stance, states that "It set the deadline forward to November 25 for the
Japanese ambassadors in America to accomplish their task [as a result
of the discussions at the Gozen Kaigi of November 5th] ...Later the No-
vember 25 deadline was changed to November29"54), despite the fact
that the primary source, the Sugiyama Memo #|1| * ^6 ,records that the
deadline was set forward to December 1st at the Gozen Kaigi of the
same day.551
APPOINTMENT OF AMBASSADOR KURUSU TO WASH-
INGTON
During the afternoon of November 3rd Foreign Minister Togo consid-
ered sending Saburo Kurusu to the U.S.561 This was a personal idea of
Togo's to support Ambassador Nomura in Washington in his efforts to
reach an agreement.571 In the early hours of November 4th, Togo invited
Kurusu to the officialresidence of the Foreign Minister.581 Togo asked
Kurusu to accept Togo's plan to transfer him to the U.S., although Togo
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predicted that it would be dangerous for Kurusu if the negotiations
failed and war broke out.59'After a littlehesitation, Kurusu accepted the
assignment,60' and the next afternoon Kurusu met Togo to ask for sup-
port for Kurusu's family in case war broke out.611
While the sincerity of Kurusu's support for Nomura in peace talks
with the U.S. is now widely known, Hull stated in his memoirs even af-
ter the war that "Foreign Minister Togo on November 3rd instructed
Saburo Kurusu, former Japanese Ambassador to Germany, to come to
Washington ostensibly to assist Nomura in his conversations with me
[Hull]".621There is no documentary evidence to indicate that the Japa-
nese leaders were seriously worried that Kurusu's career as the former
German ambassador could have negative consequences in the U.S.―Ja-
pan talks. Kurusu records in his memoirs that his career as the former
German ambassador was considered, after much discussion at the
meeting of the 4th, as an advantage in explaining to the Americans
about the Japanese stance and obligations under the Tripartite Pact
even though some possibility of a "handicap" was also predicted.63'In
the case of Foreign Minister Togo, his work, written after the end of the
war, does not even mention the discussion of the issue itself.64'
Two significant problems among many other points can clearly be
recognised here. One is that, as far as Japan's real intention in sending
Kurusu to Washington is concerned, Hull's judgement was definitely
unsound. The other point is that Japan's failure to take into serious
consideration the impression given by Kurusu's career in Germany in
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itselfindicates that the Japanese leaders obviously underestimated the
American leaders' hatred of Nazi Germany.
In fact, Hull emphasised at the meeting of November 18th with the
Japanese ambassadors that "Our people do not trust Hitler ...We feel
that, if Hitler won out, he inevitably would get around to the Far East
and double-cross Japan".651 Kurusu was surprised by the strong anti-
German tone of Hull's speech and realised that Hull's hatred of Ger-
many was much deeper than the Japanese had expected.661
When the two ambassadors, Nomura and Kurusu, met Hull and
Roosevelt on the previous day, Hull felt "from the start that he [Kurusu]
is deceitful. Knowing what I [Hull] did of Japan's intentions from the
intercepts ...";67>in contrast, Kurusu felt encouraged by Roosevelt's atti-
tude, according to Telegram #1133 of the 18th.68)
Similarly, according to Telegram #1160 of the 23rd sent from the
Embassy in Washington to Tokyo, and Kurusu's memoirs, Hull replied
to Kurusu that he supported Kurusu's proposal, withdrawal from the
Tripartite Pact, as "quite a good idea (sukoburu myo-an M.^t&'M) "69>
and that there was "one person with whom he wished to consult" about
the idea. Although Hull would not say with whom he wished to consult,
Kurusu felt that Hull's attitude was nevertheless "quite friendly".701
Hull himself, however, as already mentioned, wrote later that he had
"dismissed" Kurusu's proposal. Whatever Hull's true intention, his atti-
tude described in Kurusu's reports, recorded both before Pearl Harbor
and after the War, was quite different from what Hull recognised him-
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self in his memoirs. Hull's reaction to Kurusu's visit was indeed more
serious than Kurusu could imagine at the time : "After this visit from
Kurusu and his statement ...I [Hull] redoubled, in conversations with
the individuals in authority in Washington―among them Admiral
Stark―my warnings that Japan might attack at any time".71'
As Hull himself emphasised, the Magic translation actually implied
deceit and that there was a covert purpose to Kurusu's trip. An example
of such mistranslations in the intercepts can be found in the English
version of the Japanese message #739 which was originally sent from
Tokyo to Ambassador Nomura on November 6th, and was translated by
the Magic interpreter on the same day, U.S. Eastern Standard Time.
This message is important since "the reason why we [the Japanese] are
sending Ambassador Kurusu to you [Nomura in Washington] so
quickly" is clearly explained in it.
The Magic translation read : "To make it sound good, we are telling
the public that he is coming to help you quickly compose the unhappy
relations between the two nations". The Defence's translation presented
at the Tokyo Trial is, however, much closer to its original text: "It has
been explained to the public here that, in view of the necessity of the ne-
gotiations being speedily brought to a successful conclusion, Ambassa-
dor Kurusu has been hurriedly dispatched to assist you". Thus, it is
clear that the Magic version implies deceit by adding some phrases in-
cluding the one "To make it sound good". It is,in the Defence's category,
"insidious distortion". In fact, those phrases such as "To make it sound
good" and "the unhappy relations" are not used in its original text.721In
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any case, Hull was led to think that "he [Kurusu] was to lull us with
talkuntil the moment Japan got ready to strike".731
THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSLATORS' NOTES
Regarding the standard qualityof translations,itis not easy to compare
the American and British since,while the U.S. authoritieshave declas-
sifieda large amount of textsincluding Magic materials, far fewer de-
coded intercepts have been opened to the public by the British authori-
ties up to the present. For reasons stillunknown, the attitude of the
British authorities towards the intercepts of pre-war Japanese mes-
sages isin sharp contrast with that towards the already largely declas-
sifiedGerman messages known as "Enigma". Naturally, in the work of
many historians,including that ofProfessor Sir Harry Hinsley and C.A.
G. Simkins741,there is much analysis of the events surrounding the de-
coding of the German secret messages, but understandably littleinfor-
mation about the Japanese messages.751
In the publication of Hinsley and Alan Stripp,761there are four re-
searchers,including Stripp himself, who have contributed to the mate-
rialfocusing on the activitiesofbreaking Japanese codes during the pe-
riod afterPearl Harbor but not in the pre-war period.Itis worth noting,
however, that the Britishinterpreters were in general aware of the im-
portance of making translator'snotes in the reports for marking unclear
and uncertain words.771In the case of the war―time Japanese courses for
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intelligence services at the School of Oriental and African Studies (S.O.
A.S.) in London, the teaching staff emphasised : "We believe ...that a
student should understand exactly what is being said by every speci-
men of Japanese presented to him. Because of the subtlety of Japanese
sentence forms, we favour the provision of very careful idiomatic Eng-
lish translations of early material".781In contrast, there is to a surpris-
ing degree a dearth of translator's notes in the Magic version.
"RETRANSLATIONS" PRESENTED AT TOKYO TRIAL
In fact, soon after the end of the Pacific War, some American officials
seem to have become aware of,but concealed, the problem of mistrans-
lation. For instance, Ballantine, the representative of the State Depart-
ment to the Trial, wrote : "I strongly suspected ...that the intercepted
telegrams ...were poorly translated." But, as noted by Huddleston, "he
says nothing about their failure to represent Japanese intentions ..."79)
The issue of mistranslation first came to light at the Trial, and again in
October of the same year, 1946, when parts of Magic were published by
the Pearl Harbor Joint Committee of the United States Congress. The
messages, which were then declassified and released for publication,
were very limited both in quantity and quality. On one occasion, the
Pearl Harbor Congressional Hearings were openly informed that the
Magic translations submitted were only selected items taken from the
complete file.801Also, at the Trial, the Prosecution presented Japanese
versions of telegrams which were not the same as the originals sent
from the Tokyo Foreign Office, but which were re-translations back
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into Japanese of the English Magic translations.81'
Huddleston found that some English versions of telegrams submit-
ted at the Tokyo Trial were not Magic translations, but had been care-
fully translated by the Prosecution from the original Japanese tele-
grams without the Court being informed that these were the Prosecu-
tion's own new translations.82' Furthermore, the U.S. Prosecution pre-
sented an English version of Telegram #800 at the Tokyo Trial, a ver-
sion which was corrected by them including the last part containing "in-
dependently" from the Japanese original, and not the Magic version.
With regard to #800, Huddleston also observes that:
...there is a great difference between "Re item 2 of paragraph 3, it is
desirable that the required quantity be decided upon by an agree-
ment of both governments before the signatures are affixed to this
present agreement", as correctly translated by the Prosecution, and
"Re item 2 of paragraph 3 [noting that the reader would have referred
to the wrong telegram]. All the main items shall be considered and
settled by the two governments before signatures are affixed to this
agreement", as incorrectly translated by MAGIC. In the original
Japanese telegram the 'required quantity' refers to oil.In the MAGIC
translation one might easily have assumed "all the main items"
meant all the main items under discussion at the time. This telegram
was circulated by MAGIC on November 20, 1941, which was the day
that Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu presented Proposal B to Sec-
retary of State Hull. This could make it quite understandable why
Secretary of State Hull did not regard Proposal B as a modus vi-
vendi.831
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As far as the author is aware, Telegram #800 is not included in
"The 'Magic'Background of Pearl Harbor, Vol. 4",published in 1978 by
the U.S. authorities,841although it was presented at the Tokyo Trial.
The significantpoint is that the Prosecution did not inform the Court
that this #800 and a few other telegrams were their own new transla-
tions and corrections.The factthat they feltthe need toretranslate and
correcta number ofmessages contrasts sharply with chiefNavy decoder
Alwin Kramer's testimony at the Congressional Hearings that he knew
of only two translationerrorsin the entire file.851
THE "G-2" REPORT
On November 25th, for reasons which are stillnot clear, Secretary of
War Stimson sent a mistaken report from Army Intelligence(known as
G―2) to both Hull and Roosevelt informing that "Five Divisions have
come down from Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai and there they had
embarked on ships―30, 40, or 50 ships―and have been sighted south of
Formosa",861whereas the originalreport stated "A more or less normal
movement often to thirtytroopships in the Yangtse River below Shang-
hai".871
While Wohlstetter states:
Washington G-2's comment on the information had been thatit rep-
resented a "normal" movement, i.e.,nothing beyond what the Japa-
nese had announced that they were going to do ...The reaction of
these policymakers [Stimson, Hull, and President Roosevelt] was
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sharply different from that of G-2, where the news became trans-
formed into a "normal movement". It is interesting to observe here
that this decisive Japanese signal had taken five days ...to reach the
chief policymaker.
Professor Shinji Sudo MW9^M concludes :
The Japanese transports were, as G-2 commented, nothing unusual
but were [in reality] part of the "normal" movement ...It is hard to
understand why Stimson exaggerated the G-2 news when he re-
ported it to Roosevelt and Hull, although it was not an especially sig-
nificant report...88'
Wohlstetter states that "This actually was Admiral Ozawa's expe-
ditionary force against the Malay Peninsula", but Jun Tsunoda ftffl|l||
of the National Diet Library notes that "The truth is that the Army ex-
peditionary force for Malay left Sanya zl*& in Hainan Island on Decem-
ber4th, and the Navy Task Force which left Hitokappu Bay on Novem-
ber 26th was transmitted the instruction that the Force would be pre-
pared to abort the mission for Hawaii and go back to Japan if the diplo-
matic negotiations were successful".891 Thus Japan's military move-
ments at this stage were not "a decisive Japanese signal" to open hos-
tilitiesyet, but indicated merely preparation for that possibility. Simi-
larly, on the 28th the U.S. fleet led by Vice-Admiral William Halsey left
Pearl Harbor for Wake Island and Halsey "individually" issued his or-
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der to shoot any unknown ships and planes if the fleetfaced them. As
stated by Huddleston, "There is no question but that Japan was prepar-
ing herselffor any eventuality,as the United States was".90)
The next morning in Washington when Stimson called Roosevelt,
the President had not yet received the report. He "fairlyblew up―
jumped up into the air",and said "that that changed the whole situation
because it was an evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese".911
Hull met Roosevelt and was given approval by the President to remove
the modus vivendi of the new proposals.921According to Stimson's diary
Hull told Stimson on the telephone "I have washed my hands ofit, and
itis now in the hands of you and [Secretary of the Navy Frank] Knox,
the Army and Navy"931.
THE INFLUENCE OF CHURCHILL'S CABLE
As to the exact meaning of a cable sent by Churchill regarding the mo-
dus vivendi, a significant perception gap between the British and
Americans was exposed. Hull attributed his decisionto remove the mo-
dus vivendi mainly to the opposition from the British and Chinese
authorities,stating that:
[After receiving a cable from Churchill] ...I came to the conclusion
that we should cancel out the modus vivendi.Instead, we should pre-
sent to the Japanese solely the ten-point proposal for a general set-
tlement to which originallythe modus vivendi would have been in the
nature of an introduction ...Although the modus vivendi proposal
contained only a little"chicken feed" ...The Chinese were violently
opposed, the other interested governments either unfavorable or
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lukewarm. Their cooperation would have been essential.94'
On November 27th, BritishAmbassador Lord Halifax, according to
a memorandum of Sumner Welles, protested to the U.S. that:
He [Halifax] was not quite clearin his own mind as to the reasons
which prompted this sudden change in presenting the Japanese Gov-
ernment with a document other than the modus vivendi document...
he could not understand thisin as much as he had communicated to
Secretary Hull the fullsupport of the British Government.95'
While Welles replied that "the message sent by Mr. Churchill to the
President yesterday could hardly be regarded as 'fullsupport' but on the
contrary, very grave questioning of the course then proposed", Ambas-
sador Halifax emphasised that "thismessage had been intended merely
to express the objections on the part of the Chinese Government". Thus,
there seems to have been a serious misinterpretation between the Brit-
ish government and the American decision makers on the meaning of
Churchill'smessage of the 26th.
In this connection,F. C. Jones points out that:
The British Government―and presumably the Chinese and the
Netherlands Governments―did not know that it was the American
intention to present―together with the modus vivendi―proposals for
a comprehensive settlement ...,Churchill has indicated in his mem-
oirs that, had the British Government known of this, their fears
about China would have been removed.961
－90－
Concerning the position of the Chinese government, Jones observes
that "Whether the knowledge of this American intention would have re-
moved Chiang's opposition, too, is a moot point".971This view has been
echoed by some other observers. Professor Anthony Kubek, for instance,
states that: "The question arises here as to whether the Chinese did re-
ject this proposal. The Chinese Ambassador denied his Government
was blocking the putting into effect of a temporary arrangement which
might afford a cooling-off spell in the Far Eastern situation ...But it is
hardly conceivable that he [Hull] presented the modus vivendi to the
Generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek] in a manner designed to gain his ac-
ceptance".981
In fact, Lord Halifax emphasised on the 27th that "the Burma Road
would in fact be kept open [as requested by Chiang Kai-shek] if the mo-
dus vivendi agreement with Japan could be consummated"."Thus,
three major factors influenced the decision to remove the modus vivendi
from the Hull Note : the negative effect of the misinterpretations by the
Magic translators, the G-2 report mistakenly sent by Stimson, and the
confusion over Churchill's message.
Furthermore, Professor George Kennan has commented on
Roosevelt's foreign policy in general: "Had FDR been determined to
avoid war with the Japanese if at all possible, he would have conducted
American policy quite differently ...than he actually did".1001Robert
Dallek, however, has given a different view stating that: "This [Ken-
nan's] picture of Roosevelt's options leaves out the domestic context in
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which he had to operate. The struggle against fascism in American
minds was indelibly linked with China's fight against Japan. Though
mindful of the advantage of concentrating American power against Ber-
lin, Roosevelt also appreciated that opposition to Japan was an essen-
tial part of the moral imperative Americans saw for fighting". Thus,
Dallek emphasises that "Roosevelt could not discriminate between Ger-
many and Japan", even if he wished to do so, because of the American
social atmosphere.1011 On the other hand, Paul Schroeder has stated that
the link between Germany and Japan "was revived as an issue by the
American diplomats because it was expected to be useful in selling the
anticipated war with Japan to the American ...public which might find
it hard to understand and accept".1021Thus, the question of "cause and
effect" remains with regard to this issue.
It is significant that an observer who has examined the American
decision to abandon the modus vivendi in close detail notes :
His [Hull's] decision was evidently precipitated by Roosevelt's reac-
tion to a message from Churchill ...and by news from G-2 on Japa-
nese troop movements. The Churchill message and the G-2 report in-
tensified the general atmosphere of pessimism already provided by
Magic and by accusations of "appeasement" in the public press.103'
EFFECT OF THE REMOVAL OF THE MODUS VIVENDI
There is no doubt in retrospect that the presentation of the Hull Note
without the modus vivendi triggered the outbreak of the War within
weeks. What America's aim was in presenting the Hull Note to Japan
at that time, i.e. peace or war, has been a very provocative issue from
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1941 up to the present. For example, Professor Akira Iriye of Harvard
University states : "Japanese officials in Washington and Tokyo took
the Hull note as an indication of the wide cleavage between the two
countries, and they were of course right. However, they were off the
mark when they viewed the note as an ultimatum. It merely restated
the position that the United States would stand with China, Britain,
and the Dutch, and would invite Japan to join them in re-establishing
order in the Asian-Pacific region".1041In fact, Hull himself states in his
memoirs : "The proposal I handed Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu on
November 26 was an honest effort to keep our conversations going ...It
was Tokyo that intended to attack if the negotiations failed―not Wash-
ington. We had no plans for an attack on Japan. Japan was prepared for
war in the Pacific, we were not. We wanted peace".1051However, these
statements are not wholly compatible with other statements of his re-
corded by Stimson.
In the context of the policies established just before and after the
presentation of the Hull Note, including "how we should maneuver
them into the position of firing the first shot"106'on the 25th, "to kick the
whole thing over to tell them that he had no other proposition at all"1071
on the 26th, and "broken the whole matter off'1081on the 27th, Hull was
able to say later that it was Japan's intention to attack, not Washing-
ton's. In any case, it is questionable whether Washington "wanted
peace" or not at this stage, because the U.S. authorities, through the in-
tercepts, knew Japan's policy was that "It was Tokyo that intended to
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attack if the negotiations failed", and it was known the negotiations
would fail if the modus vivendi was removed. The author remains un-
convinced, on the basis of the materials presented in this thesis, by
Hull's "honest effort" and his intention to "invite Japan to join them" in
the Hull Note.
However, it does not mean that Hull's attitude was belligerent,
since his decision to remove the modus vivendi was made under heavy
pressure. One should recognise here the significant role of the Magic in-
tercepts, which contributed to this pressure and over-emphasised a
negative image of Japan's attitude towards the peace talks. Hull him-
self admitted that "These intercepts, bearing our code name 'Magic',
played little part in our early negotiations, but were of great importance
during the final phases."1091
Based on the analysis in this thesis the author wishes to emphasise
that the expectation for peace at this stage was realistic if an agreement
on the basis of the modus vivendi had been reached and the opening
hostilities had consequently been delayed, as analysed more fully in the
subsequent thesis ; this is in contrast with the view that the Hull Note,
even without the modus vivendi, was stilla genuine invitation to Japan
to continue negotiations.
MESSAGE TO THE EMPEROR
On November 26th, Roosevelt's plan to send a "President's Message" to
the Emperor and the Presidential Message to Congress was postponed
at the War Council because Hull again opposed it.110)In the afternoon,
the Japanese ambassadors sent a telegram (#1180) to Tokyo, U1>setting
－94－
out their own proposals for an exchange between the President and the
Emperor of conciliatory messages and the establishment of neutral na-
tions including Dutch East Indies in order to forestall British and
American military occupation in the region.
Thus, both sides were simultaneously considering1121 very similar
plans to exchange conciliatory messages between the heads of the two
nations to avert the war, or at least to delay it, but failed to notice this
significant fact. While Tokyo could not know that Roosevelt was coinci-
dentally considering a similar plan, Washington was closer to aware-
ness of the fact, since #1180 had been decoded. The Magic version, how-
ever, again failed to perceive this, due to the serious mistranslations
and distortions caused by the difficulty in distinguishing the difference
between the Japanese homonyms "shison" Ml? (Majesty) and "shison"
~f?^s (descendants, posterity). This led to their interpreting "asking
President Roosevelt to send a telegram to the Emperor" as "for the sake
of posterity".
Although Telegram #1180 was translated on the 28th,113)after the
presentation of the Hull Note to Japan on the 26th, it would not neces-
sarily have been too late if Magic had been translated accurately be-
cause the Japanese side stillcontinued to try to avert the war, even af-
ter the Liaison Council understood the Hull Note (Telegram #1189) to
be an ultimatum.1141 For example, on November 30th, Togo sent a mes-
sage to Nomura to try to request the Americans to reconsider the Hull
Note (Telegram #857) following the Liaison Council's decision of the
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29th.115)Even after the formal decision to open hostilities at the Gozen
Kaigi of December 1st, there was stillroom to reconsider the decision,
up to moments before the firstbombs were dropped.
In fact, on November 13th, the Japanese naval commanders even
discussed details of methods and techniques of communications be-
tween the fleet and aircraft so as to be able to prevent implementing the
attack plan, by calling the planes back to the aircraft carriers, in the
event of a successful outcome of diplomatic negotiations. They recog-
nised that radio communication facilitiesbetween the fleet and the dive
bombers and torpedo bombers were advanced enough to be able to call
them back at any time after taking off,but those of the fighter planes
had some technical weak points. In addition, while each bomber was ex-
pected to have a radio operator on board together with a pilot, this was
not the case with the fighter planes. Thus, it was thought that such
communications could only be really effective as long as the fighter
planes were flying together with the dive bombers and torpedo bomb-
ers.1161
Hull persuaded Roosevelt to postpone the plan to send the Presi-
dent's Message to the Emperor, stating : "I also was not in favor of the
message to the Emperor ...I knew that the Japanese themselves did not
make use of such means as a direct Presidential message. Normally
they did not shift from a bold front to one of pleading until the situation
with them was desperate. They would therefore regard the message as
our last recourse and a sign of weakness"1171 although "He [Hull] contin-
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ued to mourn the fate of the modus vivendi"1181after he handed the Hull
Note to the Japanese ambassadors. It is interesting to compare Hull's
perspective with that of Togo's expressed in Telegram #844 : "the idea of
an exchange of messages between the President and the Emperor was
not appropriate since the Hull Note [without the modus vivendi] was
not acceptable".1191Thus, Japan gave up the plan to exchange messages
between the Heads because of the omission of the modus vivendi, not
because the Japanese "did not make use of such means". In addition,
the broadcasting of the mistaken report of Tojo's aggressive speech was
perhaps caused by a miscommunication within the Japanese admini-
stration, according to Telegram #866. Whatever the truth, the damage
to U.S.-Japan relations from this misinformation was naturally quite
serious at this stage.120'
On December 7th at 08.00 (18.00 on the 6th in Washington) the U.
S. President requested the Secretary of State to send an uncoded mes-
sage to the Emperor to Ambassador Grew in Japan in spite of Stimson's
opposition.1211 The Secretary of State delayed sending it, although
Roosevelt requested that it should be sent quickly.1221At 09 : 40 (19 : 40
on the 6th) the U.S. Government announced to the media its intention
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to send a President's Message to the Emperor. At 11: 00 (21: 00 on the
6th) Secretary of State Hull sent the President's Message to the Em-
peror to Ambassador Grew.123' Tokyo received the President's Message
at 12 : 00 (22 : 00 on the 6th). Lieutenant Colonel Morio Tomura F> Jftg
H of the Army General Staff ordered a delay in delivering the Presi-
dent's Message to Grew, although the Emperor and the Japanese gov-
ernment were waiting to receive it immediately. Lieutenant Colonel
Tomura thought that the President's Message would only cause confu-
sion because of information which indicated that war had already
started : Japanese forces near Malaya had shot down an allied plane
(probably British) a day earlier. At 14 : 00 (00 : 00 on the 7th) Foreign
Minister Togo sent a very urgent Telegram, #905, to Ambassador
Nomura requesting him to confirm whether the U.S. was actually send-
ing the President's Message to Tokyo or not.124'It indicates that there
would stillhave been some hope of a different outcome if the President's
Message had arrived in time to enable Japan to abandon the attack on
Pearl Harbor scheduled for 03 : 30 (13 : 30 on the 7th) the next day. At
03 : 00 (13 : 00) Foreign Minister Togo finally met the Emperor to in-
form him that a confidential letter had been received from President
Roosevelt (only 25 minutes before the actual start of the Pearl Harbor
attack). Thus, the arrival of the President's Message was too late.
CONCLUSION
The existing literature falls into two categories : general surveys and
special studies. In the West, general surveys present Japanese expan-
sion as an escalating aggression of which the attack on Pearl Harbor
was the climax. Literature of a more specialist nature is obviously more
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valuable than general surveys. However, there stillexist issues uncon-
sidered either by Japanese or Western scholarship, which the thesis at-
tempts to illuminate. This gap exists primarily because Japanese is a
difficultlanguage for Westerners and because Japanese observers have
usually felt no need to refer to Japanese sources in English. It is also be-
cause each side, studying its own sources, has a natural tendency to
perpetuate rather than eliminate misperceptions.
Magic has been a subject of study ever since the Tokyo Trial and
most scholars have argued that the mistranslations made no difference
to the final outcome. The argument of the thesis is the opposite, namely
that mistranslation from Magic was, in fact, of decisive importance.
Had the relationship between America and Japan been one of better un-
derstanding the mistakes arising from Magic would have been trivial
and, if there had simply existed the normal level of mistrust expected
between adversaries who were nevertheless able to conduct negotia-
tions without any misconceptions, they might stillhave reached an ac-
commodation. Instead the mistranslations were built onto a misunder-
standing which had become increasingly entrenched over decades.
Above all they reinforced a belief on the American side that the Japa-
nese were deceitful, so that no attempted compromise would be worth
pursuing. It is important to recognise the fact that Magic contributed to
the outbreak of the War, rather than avoiding the issue of its impor-
tance. The rejection of historical inevitability proposed by Isaiah Berlin
of the University of Oxford is strongly endorsed here.1251
In a psychological sense, it is understandable that some observers
have wished to believe that the Pacific War was bound to happen, since
it is painful to face the question of whether the War was avoidable and
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therefore whether such a huge number of lives was wasted. The author
in fact shares this unwillingness to consider this possibility. The
sources studied in this thesis, however, do not support the theory that it
was "bound to happen".
Note : Gozen Kaigi, which is generally rendered as "Imperial Confer-
ence" but which means literally "conference in the presence of the Em-
peror", i. e. the Emperor's presence as symbolic head of state conferred
legitimacy on the proceedings.
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